Islamic Civil Society and Constitutionalism Issues in Indonesia: Observing the Expressions of the Banyumas Muslim Community in Responding to the Dynamics of State Problems in Post-Reformation

This research seeks to map out the expressions of the Banyumas Muslim community in responding to the dynamics of state problems in post-reformation with the Big Five theory (Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neurotism). This research not only maps the potential involvement of Islamic civil society, but also contributes an important perspective as an effort to stabilize society and its various social groups. The method of collecting data was by distributing purposive questionnaires collecting 165 people. All of them consisted of various Islamic community organizations. The reliability used test-retest reliability, based on Friedman’s theory with the lowest limitation of 0.90. The validity used direct validity, which is based


Introduction
After a series of controversial elections in 2014, the political divide between the 2 ideological forces is more striking than it was in the previous decade. 1 The competition between Koalisi Indonesia Hebat (KIH) and Koalisi Merah Putih (KMP) in the 2014 elections became a momentum for high political tensions in the country. 2 In addition, there were at least 313 corrupt practices (giving money, goods, services to voters and organizers) during the 2014 legislative elections in 15 provinces. This ICW (Indonesian Corruption Watch) monitoring result became a stronger danger signal than it was in 2009. 3 This has also been emphasized by NU in the 2015 PBNU National Conference (Munas) that political issues are often confined to corrupt procedural democracy. The massive push for the discourse of the compatibility of Islam and democracy is in fact not enough to mature democracy. 4 On the other hand, Muhammadiyah also from the beginning of the 47th Muhammadiyah Congress in 2015 saw that corrupt behavior, a consumptive-hedonist-materialistic society, weak law enforcement, increasing social inequality, and exploitation of natural resources by foreigners were serious problems for the nation. 5 The Economic Intelligent Unit (EIU) and Democracy Report said it was a flawed democracy. 6 The years 2014, 2017, and 2019 were the three peak moments of high political tension. 7 After the 2014 victory it was previously considered an oligarchic success with deep roots. 8 The 2019 election is a milestone in strengthening the oligarchy and political parties' hegemony, so that it is considered the worst post-reform election that has succeeded in "deceiving" and "subverting" the people. 9 From the explanation above, it appears that in this country there are many problems and increasing complexity. Corruption, social and economic inequality, unemployment and poverty, law enforcement, increasing hate speech discourse, increasing escalation of demonstrations, humorous behavior of elites and political parties, criminalization problems, widespread intimidation, hacking and terror against academics, exploitation of oligarchs, issues of intolerance and radicalism, strengthening sentiment and polarization, and not to mention the pandemic situation.
The space for the Muslim community movement in Indonesia is gaining political momentum for wider activism as part of checks and balances on state issues. The wave of democratization has been used massively by most of the Muslim community to be involved in responding to problems, especially the executive and legislative domains as part of crucial constitutional issues.
The face of Islamic civil society seems to be moving massively in search of its form in the last half of this decade, as if being challenged to be more actively involved in overseeing the process of checks and balances in state issues. On the other hand, the need to effectively guarantee the political rights of citizens and regulate and supervise the administration of the state in an orderly manner has encouraged every country to adhere to the notion of constitutionalism; understand the state, which idealizes a limited government and avoids arbitrariness. 10 As a result, Islamic civil society is required to strengthen its growth and development and increase its participation in the democratization process and ensure that the state consistently follows the constitutional order.
In the context of political involvement, the reality of Central Java shows the rise of pragmatism. According to Makhasin, the fading of ideological orientation  and the strengthening of pragmatism are caused by the rise of money politics and the strengthening of populism demands in the media and voters, 11 no exception in Banyumas, where socio-historically the people are the result of the syncretism of two cultures (Javanese and Javanese). 12 This alluding to the political conditions and cultural realities of the people in Banyumas is certainly not only part of the face of Islamic civil society with a cablaka style. And this is not an easy task to maintain a progressive and Islamic political behavior, but also at the same time to test how they are involved in responding to the dynamics of state problems as an issue of constitutionalism with their blakasuta; how they view state governance, whether they really pay attention to the dynamics of state governance. How is their emotional situation and primordialism in their offense with political parties; whether to fully comply with the authority of the ruling political party and all its policy directions. The extent to which Islamic civil society cares about local problems in Banyumas; whether they are really serious about participating and establishing relationships in government policies.

Theory and Methodology
This research is based on one of the contemporary behaviorism theories, 13 the Big Five theory, especially related to the implementation in political behavior initiated by Jeffery J. Mondak,14 which is also moderately interpreted by his genealogical colleagues; Dinesen, 15 and Kathrin Ackermann. 16 Thus the scope of this research is how the response of Islamic civil society in Banyumas to the efforts to checks and balances on national life as part of the issue of constitutionalism; is it Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, or Neuroticism? (OCEAN) Mainly, this research uses a sociological lens as the approach. This is an effort to understand the dialectic of the Muslim community as an Islamic Civil Society in Banyumas, especially in the last half-decade, from the beginning era of President Joko Widodo until now. In the latest development by Kathrin Ackerman, 17 the main indicator of each part of OCEAN are: The main indicator of Openness to Experience (O) is open minded people tend to be critical citizens. They critically examine political, social, norms and authority values. Hence, they are likely to have low political trust. They are also open to appreciating opportunities to influence policy issues directly (whether through popular voting or simply exchanging ideas during campaigns). They often interpret government policies as a signal of the need for government policy correction. Their critical attitude tends to reduce institutional trust among the public.
As the main characteristic of the Conscientiousness (C) category, they tend to be more careful, appreciate control, make decisions very carefully and want to maintain control over a situation. Also, they tend to have a conservative attitude and status quo bias. They obey norms and laws and are willing to accept authority.
On the other hand, the main pattern of Extraversion (E) is to have a tendency of a conservative attitude and support for hierarchical acceptance. There is a high level of trust in institutionalized matters, which is in line with the desire for social interaction and acceptance of political authority. They like to enjoy the possibility to participate in government policies and express their opinion in public engagement.
In the Agreeableness (A) indicator, they generally avoid conflict and are interested in establishing good relations with fellow citizens, generally pursuing altruistic goals. They have a high level of trust in political institutions. Once the political arena radiates conflict, these people tend to withdraw from it to avoid conflict.
Those belonging to Neuroticism (N) tend to be easily worried and often interpret political and social developments as unfair and unsatisfactory. As a result, their views on politics are rather negative and their institutional trust is low. And the trend correlation is O with E, or C with A and N. The method of data collection in this research used a survey/questionnaire with a Likert scale (1-5) with each component containing 7 questions which is integrated into the constitutionalism theme. Thus, the total was 35 substantive questions, either favorable or unfavorable. The validity used direct validity, which is based on rational analysis and professional decisions, in this case Jeffery J. Mondak's Big Five theory, 18 Dinesen,19 and Kathrin Ackermann, 20 with proportional adjustments for current conditions in Indonesia. This is because in Indonesia, the development and application of the Big Five theory in political behavior tend to be less profitable. Because of this, it needs concrete adaptation to make it useful operationally.
Meanwhile, to ensure reliability, I used test-retest reliability, by testing these questions on 30 other respondents with the same characteristics. As a result, based on Friedman's theory with a lower limit of 0.90, it was found that none of the questions had a low score that resulted in elimination, even though some of these questions were corrected later to produce the best data. In the adaptation process, the 35 questionnaires received progressive improvements.
I also used purposive sampling to get what the author means by Islamic civil society, which requires certain considerations or characteristics closely related to previously known population characteristics, based on the research objectives, whether male or female. The total sample that managed to collect was 165 respondents, representing Islamic civil society in Banyumas, consisting of various Islamic organization; Nahdhatul Ulama (53%), Muhammadiyah (36%), Indonesian Islamic Da'wah Council (DDII), Al-Irsyad, Syarekat Islam (SI), Jama'ah Ahmadiyyah (JI), Indonesian Islamic Da'wah Institute (LDII), Tarbiyah and Salafi (11%).

Islamic Civil Society
The interesting thing about the notion of civil society comes from Larry Diamond's notes which define it as a social activity that is open with principles, voluntarily, emerges by itself, with the ability to be self-sufficient, autonomous from the Nation and obedient to internal rules. Usually, civil society is manifested in the form of an organization; religion, ethnicity, group, or association that maintains shared truths, values, beliefs, and symbols. 21 Indeed, it appears that economic factors, psychological pressure, inability to face social change, and the isolation of individuals from social society are the scientific reasons behind people's participation in Islamic movements. 22 The concept of civil society in Indonesia does not lie in historical products, but should be placed at the level of the process; as an analytical framework to understand the growth and development of society in the process of democratization in Indonesia. 23 The Islam movement in Indonesia, which looks dynamic with its variants of movement, will still be very influential in the political contestation in Indonesia and most importantly in the growth of democratization. 24 Nevertheless, the rise of civil society must clearly be accompanied by the presence of leaders who have a strong capacity to encourage the maturation process of civil society to suppress social resistance from the influence of group sentiment, and to seek empowering communities and organizations to work together to solve their own problems and develop organizational capacity for the sake of the realization of a civilized democracy. 25 In this way, the existence of a common understanding, belief, mutual trust, and common view of goals and missions are prerequisites for the realization of civil society. Strengthening civil society is essentially an instrument to counter the nation. 26 Here, the Islamic Civil Society in Banyumas has an open political perspective, even though each of these Islamic organizations has differences between components in the Big Five theory.

Meeting Point and Sentiment of Islamic Civil Society
In general, the result of this research shows that Openness (3.76), Conscientiousness (2.70), Extraversion (3.59), Agreeableness (2.56), and Neuroticism (2.92). Here, Islamic civil society in Banyumas has an "open political perspective", even though each of these Islamic organizations has differences between components in the Big Five theory. This means that Islamic civil society is careful about the dynamics of national governance.
Bringing up the problematic topic of handling law enforcement, for example, according to them, still needs to be monitored. The findings of the Survey Institute that greatly describe the increasing cases of corruption and bribery in this country are also an interesting part of their consumption. Therefore, they have a strong side to voice that the reality of unemployment and poverty in the community is still a lot. They are anxious to see the close radius of economic inequality in society.
The openness character is strongly correlated with extraversion (3.59). This means that Islamic civil society, apart from having openness as described, they also have a commitment to participate and establish relations in government policies. This is because the Islamic community needs to get involved in public policy rather than being dissolved, not too tired of thinking hard about the widespread circulation of narcotics and liquor in the community.
In viewing how the country is managed by the government, the majority of the Banyumas Islamic Civil Society (64%) stated that they are careful about the dynamics of national governance. This can be seen at least because they (56%) like to comment on bureaucratic problems in the government and most (75%) are interested in talking about the importance of public participation, seeing the reality of social inequality, the majority (76%) also like to bring up the topic of problematic handling of enforcement law, thus there is still supervision in its enforcement.
Although the Islamic community in Banyumas (54%) views that the head of country is a symbol of the nation which appears more in political aspirations than an academic understanding of the constitution, the Banyumas Islamic Civil Society (88%) also strongly views that the behavior of conglomerates and elite officials who do not comply with paying taxes, do not deserve state forgiveness.
Here, it can be said that they are quite careful in making arguments about national problems even though some of them (30%) seems doubtful if they are said to be "careful". However, the most ambiguous attitude (51%) of Banyumas Islamic civil society in its view of national governance can be seen especially in the case of KPK (National Corruption Eradication Commission). They seem not too sure when there is a statement that many big cases handled by KPK are allegedly stuck due to the impact of National Insight Test (TWK) which shocked the public with the excuse of an absurd Taliban, exchanged policies, and in the end managed to get rid 57 best personnels of KPK. From this, it can be interpreted that in fact they are not really concerned about how the nation is managed by the government.
In seeing how strong the level of primordialism of Islamic civil society parties in Banyumas, we can see from their statement that they (60%) tend to obey the authority of the ruling political party and all its policy directions. This can be seen in some of them (40%) who are doubtful that they are being confirmed to be less talkative about the problems of hacking and terror in academics that are against the government. In addition, they doubted (39%) the Survey Institute's explanation, especially when describing the fact that freedom of expression was weak in criticizing the government. Most of the Muslim community (43%) also feel that hatred is a barometer of academics that often explains the high level of social inequality. Also, they (53%) view that citizens can report hate speech by people/community groups against state officials.
Interestingly, most of the Islamic civil society in Banyumas (74%-75%) feel that the current government is half-hearted in protecting against a lot of corruption and the increasing number of demonstrations in the community because it is the impact of the behavior of the nation's elite. Here, Islamic civil society sees that corruption and demonstrations are also the handiwork of state administrators. When in the discussion room, they do not keep their distance (57%) when involved in discussing so much criminalization to figures who criticize the government and they (62%) do not like to hinder the collective awareness of the community in criticizing government policies.
Nevertheless, Islamic civil society (44%) feels that cases of intolerance are more dangerous than the problem of hegemony and exploitation of oligarchs. This means that more Banyumas Islamic civil society focuses more on cases of intolerance than corporate octopuses. Still, they (51%) agree that the issue of radicalism that divides the nation is under the control of the power elite. If we look at it from the perspective of the entire Islamic civil society in Banyumas, we will find that there is a common ground for their point of view. Both in the aspect of assertiveness and ambiguity. In terms of assertiveness, the benchmark is the low neutral score of the questioners. When viewed from the statements with the lowest percentage of neutrality or in other words the most assertive, Islamic civil society in Banyumas has a spirit that is close to each other between Islamic Ormas in the following matters: First, they have the same emotional frequency towards the privileges of conglomerates and elite officials who display constitutional crimes. (5% neutral) Second, they expressly have a close spirit in voicing high unemployment and poverty in the community. (6% neutral) Third, they are on the same frequency of empathy when faced with rich-poor economic inequality. (9% neutral) It is very clear that they not only stand in the way to counter the nation, 27 but also maintain shared truths, values, beliefs, and symbols. 28 Meanwhile, when viewed from the side of ambiguity, for example, between Islamic civil society; NU and Muhammadiyah. NU appears to be more dominant in positioning itself as a guardian of social stability (49%), rather than explicitly stating itself in the involvement of social movements (39%). Hence, it is natural that on the one hand, there is no interest in raising the issue of hacking and terror against academics criticizing the government (38%), but on the other hand, seeing the issue of radicalism as if it grew naturally from grassroots rather than a product of power (37%). Therefore, it is natural that a non-conflictual perspective on the government is a compromise option that is considered beneficial. (37%) The same compromising view also is more dominantly believed by Muhammadiyah. (42%) So, it is natural that on the one hand, they are not interested in raising the issue of hacking and terror against academics criticizing the government, (40%) and as if they do not want to appear in the involvement of social movements. (40%) Interestingly, Muhammadiyah seems half-hearted to participate and establish relations with the government (40%), as well as doubts about positioning itself as a guardian of social stability. (40%) Here, the rise of civil society has almost no point to understanding for the presence of leaders who have a great capacity to encourage the process of strengthening civil society, to suppress social resistance from the influence of group sentiment and strive for community empowerment and work together in solving their own problems and developing their organizational capacities for the realization of a civilized democracy. 29

Conclusion
The results of the study show that on the one hand, they have the character of extraversion (E) which has a more conservative attitude, encourages acceptance of hierarchy, and has more high trust in institutionalized matters (score 3.59). But on the other hand, they tend to be openness to experience (O) characters who have a critical attitude towards political, social values, norms and authority (score 3.76).
However, even though most Islamic civil society agreed to intervene in public policy side by side with the power through the movement, on the other hand they maintained sentiment towards conglomerates/official elites who received "pardon" as a privilege. At this point, Islamic civil society is not doing its best to deal with high inequality. There seems to be a kind of Islamic regimist, borrowing Robert Hefner's term. It could be that Islamic civil society is at the point of homless of personal identity, as Alberto Melucci called it, due to the pressures of globalization and capitalism that have shaken stability which then requires individuals to rebuild their identity and at the same time their home continuously.